United States v. Moore
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 9th day of July, two thousand twenty-one.
AMALYA L. KEARSE,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. No. 19-3437-cr
DANIEL GLADDEN, AKA RAZ, AKA
RAZ GLADDEN, AKA NOODLES, AKA
The late Circuit Judge Robert A. Katzmann, formerly a member of the panel, died before this summary
order was filed. Under 2d Cir. IOP E(b), this appeal is being decided by the remaining members of the
panel, who are in agreement.
For Appellee: David C. Pitluck, Assistant United States
Attorney (Samuel P. Nitze, Assistant United
States Attorney, on the brief), for Richard P.
Donoghue, United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
For Defendant-Appellant: Edward S. Zas, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Federal Defenders of New York,
Inc., New York, NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York (Garaufis, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
On March 1, 2021, we issued a summary order vacating the district court’s sentencing order
dated October 17, 2019. We remanded the case to allow the district court to address an ambiguity
in the sentencing transcript and to clarify its intentions regarding the aggregate length of the prison
term that it was imposing on Defendant-Appellant Christopher Moore for his several crimes of
conviction. United States v. Moore, 845 F. App’x 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2021).
In an order dated April 16, 2021, the district court confirmed that it did not earlier overlook
the applicability of Moore’s separate 60-month sentence when it selected a drug-offense sentence
for Moore. United States v. Moore, No. 92-CR-200-NGG, Dkt. 538 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 2021).
As stated in its 2021 order, the district court then “reenter[ed] the terms of the 2019 Order, allowing
Mr. Moore’s sentence to stand at 324 months’ imprisonment for the drug offense, to be followed
by 60 months’ imprisonment for the firearms offense.” Id.
Our March 1, 2021 order provided that either Moore or the government could restore our
jurisdiction following the district court’s entry of a clarifying order. Moore, 845 F. App’x at 54
(citing United States v. Jacobson,
15 F.3d 19
, 22 (2d Cir. 1994)). Moore made such a request. The
appeal has therefore been reinstated.
On appeal, Moore again argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration of a partial reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), urging that his
324-month drug-offense sentence is substantively unreasonable. He also renews his appeal of the
denial of his motion for sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (the “First Step Act”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
remaining underlying facts and procedural history in this case and refer to them only as needed to
explain our order affirming the district court’s denial of these motions.
Beginning with Moore’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), we review for abuse of
discretion the district court’s decision to deny Moore’s full requested sentencing reduction.
See United States v. Borden,
564 F.3d 100
, 104 (2d Cir. 2009). “[A] district court has abused its
discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible
Moore argues that the district court erred by placing inappropriate weight on certain facts
in its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis. In Moore’s view, the district court placed more weight on the
serious and violent nature of his 1993 offense conduct than that factor may bear, because the crimes
occurred nearly 30 years ago. Moore also posits that the district court placed too little weight on
the evidence of his rehabilitation since his conviction. He points to his ongoing contact with his
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes,
and citations are omitted.
family, his authorship of an educational guidebook for young people, and his improving
On review for abuse of discretion, we find this argument unpersuasive. Our court will only
rarely disturb the district court’s weighing of various aggravating and mitigating factors in
imposing a sentence: “Generally, if the ultimate sentence is reasonable and the sentencing judge
did not commit procedural error in imposing that sentence, we will not second guess the weight
(or lack thereof) that the judge accorded to a given factor or to a specific argument made pursuant
to that factor.” United States v. Pope,
554 F.3d 240
, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, the district
court’s decision demonstrates that it carefully considered the facts highlighted by Moore and
arrived at a reasoned conclusion that a sentence of 324 months on the drug conspiracy count is
appropriate under § 3553(a). Moore neither alleges procedural error in the district court’s
consideration, nor can he demonstrate that the overall sentence imposed by the district court is
unreasonable: the 324-month sentence on the conspiracy charge falls within the applicable U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months, and the consecutive 60-month sentence on the
§ 924(c) charge is the mandatory minimum under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i),
(D)(ii). The district court twice before, in written decisions, reduced Moore’s sentence, once in
2009 in light of Amendment 706 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and once in 2015 in light of
Amendments 782 and 788 to the Guidelines. We identify no abuse of its discretion in the sentence
imposed or in the district court’s denial of Moore’s motion for reconsideration.
Moving to Moore’s First Step Act challenge, we likewise review for abuse of discretion a
district court’s denial of relief to an eligible defendant. See United States v. Moore,
975 F.3d 84
88 (2d Cir. 2020). Moore advances primarily the same arguments here as he did in the context of
his § 3582(c)(2) motion, and these arguments are unpersuasive for the same reasons. In support of
his position, Moore points additionally to several cases in which a defendant serving a sentence
for a crack cocaine-related conviction received a sentencing reduction under the First Step Act.
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, No. 04-cr-48 (JSR),
2019 WL 2433660
(S.D.N.Y. June 11,
2019). But the First Step Act does not mandate sentence reductions; rather, reductions under its
terms are committed to a district court’s sound discretion. See First Step Act § 404(c), 132 Stat. at
5222 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant
to this section.”); Moore, 975 F.3d at 89. Moore is not entitled to a First Step Act sentencing
reduction simply because certain other defendants received such relief.
We have considered Moore’s remaining arguments and find in them no basis for disturbing
the district court’s decision. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk